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BOOK REVIEW  
A REVIEW OF ALEXANDER A. BOVE, JR., TRUST 
PROTECTORS: A PRACTICE MANUAL WITH FORMS 
RICHARD C. AUSNESS* 
Alexander A. Bove, Jr. has recently written a thoughtful, 
comprehensive, and practical book entitled, “Trust Protectors: A 
Practice Manual with Forms.”1  Mr. Bove is a practicing lawyer in 
Boston and has taught courses in estate planning for many years at 
Boston University School of Law.  He frequently serves as an expert 
witness and has lectured extensively in the United States and Europe 
on trusts, wills, asset protection, and estate planning.2  In addition, he 
has written numerous books and articles on these subjects.3 
The book describes the powers and rights of a trust protector, 
as well as the fiduciary duties and potential liabilities associated with 
this position.  The author examines the relationship between the trust 
protector and the trustee.  He also discusses the role of the courts in 
this area and identifies a number of practical issues that lawyers 
should consider when they draft trust instruments that contemplate 
the appointment of a trust protector.  Finally, the author provides an 
extensive collection of forms, both in print and on a compact disc, to 
assist drafters. 
                                                   
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Jr. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 
1968 University of Florida; LL.M. 1973 Yale University.  
1 See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., TRUST PROTECTORS: A PRACTICE MANUAL WITH FORMS (2014) 
[hereinafter TRUST PROTECTORS].  
2 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv. 
3 See, e.g., Alexander A. Bove, Jr., THE COMPLETE BOOK OF WILLS, ESTATES & TRUSTS (3d ed. 2005); 
Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Selecting a Trust Protector, 152 TR. & EST. 13 (2013); Alexander A. Bove, Jr., 
The Case Against the Trust Protector, 25 PROB. & PROP. 50 (2011); Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust 
Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog or Expensive Exotic Pet?, 30 EST. PLAN. 390 (2003). 
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In Chapter Two, the author examines the origins and 
characteristics of the office of a trust protector.  A trust protector is a 
person who exercises power over a trust, but who is not a trustee.4  
According to the author, “[t]he position of protector is typically 
included in a trust for the purpose of allowing or causing the trust to 
adjust to future changes of any nature affecting the purposes of the 
trust, the interests of the beneficiaries, and the intentions of the 
settlor.”5  Although the term seems to have first been used in 
connection with offshore asset protection trusts,6 the idea of someone 
exercising power over a trust is not a new one.  Trust advisors have 
performed a similar function in the United States and other countries 
for almost a hundred years.7  However, legislatures, courts, and many 
commentators have failed to recognize this connection and, therefore, 
have tended to treat the office of trust protector as sui generis.8 
Chapter Three identifies the trust protector as a fiduciary.  A 
recurring theme throughout the book is that trust protectors normally 
exercise their powers in a fiduciary capacity.9  This characterization 
as a fiduciary provides the basis for many of the author’s observations 
about the powers and rights of trust protectors, their duties and 
liabilities, and their relationship to trustees.  Considering the trust 
protector as a fiduciary also provides the courts with a basis in 
enforcing the decisions of trust protectors and reviewing the exercise 
of their powers.  The exact nature of a trust protector’s fiduciary 
duties will depend on the powers that they exercise, but at a 
minimum those duties will include loyalty, impartiality, and good 
faith.10  The fiduciary status of trust protectors will be discussed in 
more detail later in this review. 
Chapter Four concerns the powers of a trust protector.  These 
powers are typically enumerated in the trust instrument, although in 
some states, potential powers are also set forth in statutory form.11  In 
this chapter, the author provides an extensive list of powers that may 
be vested in a trust protector, including the powers to: (1) remove, 
add, and/or replace trustees; (2) add and replace protectors; (3) veto or 
direct distributions from the trust by the trustee; (4) settle disputes 
                                                   
4 See Andrew Holden, TRUST PROTECTORS 2 (David Brownbill ed., 2011); see also TRUST PROTECTORS, 
supra note 1, at 11. 
5 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 12. 
6 See Richard Lewis, Note, The Foreign Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust as Asset Protection: Potential 
for Abuse and Suggestions for Reform, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 613, 618 (2003). 
7 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 9. 
8 “Of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.”  Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
9 See TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1. 
10 See Richard C. Ausness, When Is a Trust Protector a Fiduciary?, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 277, 305-
07 (2014). 
11 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 44, 48. 
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among parties to the trust; (5) add or delete trust beneficiaries; (6) 
change the situs and governing law of the trust; (7) veto or direct 
investment decisions; (8) authorize special investments or holdings; 
(9) require consent in order to exercise the power of appointment; (10) 
grant a power of appointment; (11) determine whether an event of 
duress has occurred (a power often found in asset protection trusts); 
(12) amend the trust’s administrative provisions; (13) amend the 
trust’s dispositive provisions; (14) amend the trust in response to 
changes in the law or circumstances that may affect the purposes of 
the trust; (15) approve trustee accounts; (16) terminate the trust and 
direct disposition of the assets; and (17) establish terms and 
conditions with regard to any of the foregoing.12  Furthermore, as in 
the case of trustees, additional powers may be implied when 
necessary for the trust protector to perform essential functions.13 
Despite the multitude of potential powers that can be vested in 
a trust protector, the author warns against giving trust protectors too 
much authority, declaring that: 
The objective in granting powers is not to pile on as 
many powers as one can think of but rather to select 
those powers that, given the duration and purposes of 
the trust, would seem most useful in furthering the 
smooth administration of the trust and the realization 
of the settlor’s intentions.14 
The author also addresses the question of how each trust protector 
should exercise his or her vested powers when the settlor appoints 
multiple trust protectors.15  He concludes that the rule of unanimity, 
which applies to co-trustees and requires multiple trustees to act 
unanimously, should apply to co-trust protectors as well unless the 
trust instrument provides otherwise.16 
In Chapter Seven, the author states the trust must provide 
certain rights in order for a trust protector to carry out his or her 
duties effectively.17  These rights include the right to information, 
standing to enforce claims on behalf of the trust, indemnification for 
reasonable expenses, and compensation for work performed on behalf 
of the trust.18  The author points out that the trust protector’s right to 
                                                   
12 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 46. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 47. 
15 Id. at 49-50. 
16 Id. at 49. 
17 See TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 71. 
18 Id. 
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information is similar to that of a beneficiary and would include: 
…[I]nformation to which the beneficiaries and the 
protector in a fiduciary position would have the right to 
view would include the trust instrument itself, and any 
documents modifying it or appended to it; accounting 
and financial statements; tax returns and all related 
schedules; fiduciary appointments and related 
documents and correspondence, such as removal and 
appointment of trustees and protectors; trustee 
minutes; and generally, where the protector is 
concerned, any information or documents reasonably 
necessary to enable the protector to knowledgeably 
consider the exercise of his duties and powers.19 
Another necessary right of a trust protector is the ability to sue on 
behalf of the trust in order to enforce claims.20  Normally, it is the 
trustee’s responsibility to enforce these claims, but there may be some 
instances where the trustee cannot bring suit because he/she is an 
adverse adverse party or has some other conflict of interest.21  
Although there is little case law on this issue, a trust protector should 
have standing to sue when necessary to carry out his duties to the 
trust.22  Like a trustee, a trust protector should be indemnified for any 
expenses incurred on behalf of the trust.23  Finally, trust protectors 
should be reasonably compensated for their work.24 
According to the author, a trust protector serving in a 
fiduciary capacity has a number of duties that are inherently attached 
to that office.25  These are discussed in Chapter Five.  One of the most 
controversial of these duties is the duty to monitor the trustee.26  This 
issue arose in Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, 
P.C.,27 when a successor trustee sued the trust protector for failing to 
monitor the activities of a trustee who depleted the assets of the $1.7 
million trust set up to support a quadriplegic accident victim.28  
Reversing a summary judgment for the defendant, a Missouri appeals 
court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether 
                                                   
19 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 73. 
20 Id. at 75-80. 
21 Id. at 78-79. 
22 Id. at 71. 
23 Id. 
24 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 75-83. 
25 See id. at 55. 
26 Id. at 57-59. 
27 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 58 (citing Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, 
P.C., 283 S.W.3d 786, 789-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
28 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 1. 
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the trust protector had a duty to monitor the trustee’s actions, and if 
necessary, to remove him.29  The author, who served as an expert 
witness for the plaintiff in that case, strongly believes that such a 
duty exists when the trust protector has the power to remove the 
trustee.30 
In addition, the author expresses the idea that, when 
exercising a power, a trust protector must act impartially and may not 
personally benefit from his actions.31  Moreover, a trust protector 
should avoid conflicts of interest and should exercise independent 
judgment rather than acting as an agent of the trustee or the trust 
beneficiaries.32  Consequently, when a trust protector’s consent is 
required for certain purposes, he should not give blanket ex ante33 
consent to the trustee, but instead should retain his right to oversee 
the trustee’s actions.34 
Like a trustee, a trust protector who violates or fails to carry 
out his fiduciary duties risks being held personally liable for any 
losses the trust suffers as a result of his breach of duty.35  In Chapter 
Six, the author considers this issue as well as the wisdom and 
effectiveness of exculpatory clauses.  Responding to the common 
practice of relieving trust protectors from liability for breach of their 
fiduciary duties, the author declares that  “[w]here the position is a 
fiduciary one, total exculpation would be against public policy, 
although exposure can be limited to acts which are in the category of 
gross negligence, bad faith, dishonesty, fraud, or willful misconduct.”36 
In Chapter Eight, the author explores the complex and 
potentially contentious relationship between trust protectors and 
trustees.  Since the trustee, not the trust protector, holds title to the 
trust property, it is often the trustee who will carry out the directions 
of the trust protector.37  In cases where the trust protector’s powers 
are negative, such as the power to veto distributions, the power to 
veto will trump the power to distribute.  For this reason, a number of 
state statutes purport to exonerate a trustee who merely carries out a 
trust protector’s instructions.38  However, as the author points out, 
these statutes have “the deleterious effect of undermining, if not 
                                                   
29 Id. at 3. 
30 Id. at 59. 
31 Id. at 60. 
32 Id. at 62-63. 
33 “Based on assumption and prediction, on how things appeared beforehand, rather than in hindsight.”  
Ex ante, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
34 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 60-62. 
35 Id. at 65. 
36 Id. at 68. 
37 Id. at 11, 85-86. 
38 Id. at 89, 91. 
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disregarding altogether, the basic role of the trustee, which is to 
administer and protect the integrity of the trust.”39  Therefore, 
according to the author, at the very least, “…the trustee [as a 
fiduciary] has a duty to make a reasonable inquiry into the details 
and propriety of the protector’s instructions, rather than to blindly 
follow such instructions.”40  If the trustee believes that the terms of 
the trust do not permit the trust protector’s instructions, he should 
refuse to comply with them, and, if necessary, apply to the 
appropriate court for instructions.41 
Chapter Nine examines the interaction between courts and 
trust protectors.  As the author points out, there are almost no cases 
involving this issue in the United States.42  On the other hand, he 
laments: 
[t]he fact that there have been hundreds of cases 
dealing with the subject of trust advisors 
unfortunately has been totally ignored by the 
[American] courts, despite the fact that the roles are 
the very same and that such cases may offer the 
courts important insight in the process of resolving 
issues involving the protector.43 
The author concedes that courts do not have much of a role to play 
when the trust protector is not a fiduciary, because a non-fiduciary is 
free to do as he pleases as long as he does not act contrary to the 
terms of the trust.44  However, a court’s potential involvement in the 
trust’s affairs is greatly increased when the trust protector is deemed 
to be a fiduciary.  In that instance, courts should have the power to 
oversee or review the trust protector’s conduct.45 
This judicial oversight may take a number of forms.  For 
example, the author identifies a foreign case in which a court 
appointed a trust protector when the settlor failed to do so.46  Other 
foreign courts  exercised the power to remove a trust protector for a 
serious breach of trust.47  Based on these foreign cases, and Papiernik 
                                                   
39 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 92. 
40 Id. at 99. 
41 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. e (2007). 
42 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 111. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 113-14. 
45 Id. at 117. 
46 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 117 (citing Rawcliffe v. Steele [1993] Manx LR 426, 514 (Isle of 
Man). 
47 Id. at 117, 119 (citing Re Freiburg Tr., Mourant & Co., Trs., Ltd. v. Magnus [2006] 6 ITELR 1078 
(Jersey RC); Centre Trustees (C.I.) Ltd. & Langry Tr. Co. (C.I.) Ltd. v. Pabst, 2009 JLR 202 (RC2009); In 
the Matter of the Circle Tr., [2006] CILR 323 (Cayman Is.). 
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v. Papiernik,48 an Ohio case involving a trust advisor, the author 
concludes that American courts should have the power to appoint or 
remove trust protectors when circumstances warrant such action.49  In 
addition, the author argues that a court, upon the request of an 
interested party, should be able to review the appointment of a trust 
protector, who, like a trustee, is a fiduciary under the trust.50 
Relying on Re Rogers,51 a Canadian case involving a 
recalcitrant trust advisor, the author concludes that following a trust 
protector’s exercise of a power, or his refusal to exercise a power, a 
court may override his decision and take action on its own if it 
determines that the trust protector’s conduct was improper under the 
circumstances.52  Similarly, a court should also have the authority to 
suspend a trust protector’s powers to prevent a breach of fiduciary 
duty, considering it has the power to remove a protector as well as 
override his decisions.53  Furthermore, the author concludes that a 
court has the power to surcharge a trust protector when his wrongful 
conduct causes a financial loss to the trust.54  This result is consistent 
with the way courts treat trust advisors.55  Finally, although courts 
are generally reluctant to interfere with the exercise of a discretionary 
power, in certain cases, it may become necessary for a court to compel 
the exercise of a trust protector’s power.56 
Practicing lawyers, particularly those who are new to the area 
of trust protectors, will find the material in Chapter Ten especially 
useful, as it contains a copious amount of practical planning and 
drafting advice.  The first issue for a drafter and his client to decide is 
whether or not to provide for a trust protector in the trust 
instrument.57  The author cautions that trust protectors should not be 
used in conjunction with certain entities, such as LLCs, partnerships, 
and corporations.58  On the other hand, irrevocable trusts can benefit 
from the addition of a trust protector, particularly if the trusts are  
expected to be of long duration.59  Trust protectors can also be used in 
connection with revocable trusts if there is reason to think that the 
                                                   
48 Id. at 120 (citing Papiernik v. Papiernik, 544 N.E.2d 664, 45 Ohio St. 3d 337 (Ohio 1989)). 
49 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 117-20. 
50 Id. at 120. 
51 Id. at 122 (citing Re Rogers, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 116 (Can. Ont., C.A.)). 
52 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 122-23. 
53 Id. at 123-24; see also Re M. Settlement [2009] JRC 140 para. 2 (Jersey RC). 
54 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 124-25. 
55 See Warner v. First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 236 F.2d 853, 861,1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 2841 (8th 
Cir. 1956). 
56 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 125-26. 
57 Id. at 130. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 138. 
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settlor may become incapacitated at some time in the future.60 
Once the decision is made to utilize a trust protector, the 
parties must decide what qualities they are looking for in a potential 
appointee.  According to the author, “[t]o some extent, the knowledge, 
experience, and judgment required in a candidate for the position of 
protector will depend upon the extent of the powers to be given the 
protector.”61  If the trust protector’s powers are narrow and do not 
require any special knowledge, then a candidate may be suitable 
simply by way of being responsible, sensible, and trustworthy.62  On 
the other hand, the appointment of an individual with a professional 
background, such as an attorney, accountant, or trust officer, may be 
necessary if the trust is complicated, large, or of long duration.63  It is 
also in the best interests of the settlor and beneficiaries not to have a 
person who maintains an interest in the trust be a trust protector, in 
order to avoid concerns of self-interest, bad faith, or breach of 
fiduciary duties.64 
Another issue a drafter and his client may face is whether the 
settlor should appoint more than one person to serve as trust 
protector.  Although there are certain advantages to having a single 
individual act as a trust protector, the author notes that a use of a 
committee might be better in some cases.65  He also considers the pros 
and cons of appointing a corporation or a limited liability company to 
serve as trust protector.66 
Some of the most practical information in the book is located 
in the section on drafting considerations.67  The author declares that 
the trust instrument should clearly state that the trust protector is a 
fiduciary and will act in a fiduciary capacity.68  The drafter should 
also set forth the basis upon which the trust protector shall be 
compensated.69  The trust protector should be authorized to hire 
agents to assist him in carrying out his duties.70  Like a trustee, a 
trust protector should be entitled to reimbursement from the trust for 
expenses incurred to defend against claims brought against him.  
However, a trust protector should not be reimbursed for successful  
                                                   
60 Id. at 138. 
61 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 138. 
62 Id. at 138-39. 
63 Id. at 141. 
64 Id. at 139. 
65 Id. at 145. 
66 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 146. 
67 Id. at 146-47. 
68 Id. at 147. 
69 Id. at 148. 
70 Id. at 148-49. 
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lawsuits against him that involve bad faith, gross negligence, or 
willful misconduct.71 
The trust instrument should enumerate the trust protector’s 
powers.  As the author observes, this “array of powers may be very 
brief or very broad, depending upon the objectives of the settlor, the 
purposes of the trust, the duration of the trust, and the circumstances 
of the family or other beneficiaries.”72  The author identifies and 
discusses at least twenty powers, rights, and restrictions that the 
drafter should consider including in the provisions of the trust: 1) the 
power to remove and replace the trustee; 2) the power to enforce 
claims; 3) the right to reimbursement; 4) the right to information; 5) 
the power to amend the trust; 6) the power to add or delete 
beneficiaries; 7) the power to decant; 8) the power to appoint into 
another trust; 9) the power to change the situs or governing law of the 
trust; 10) the power to terminate the trust; 11) the power to consent to 
or veto the trustee’s actions; 12) a prohibition against actions that 
that would adversely affect the tax situation of the settlor’s or a 
beneficiary’s estate; 13) the provision of a mechanism for filling 
vacancies or appointing successor trust protectors; 14) a list of parties 
who are excluded from serving as trust protectors; 15) a provision 
dealing with the resignation of the trust protector; 16) a provision 
dealing with the trust protector’s incapacity; 17) insolvency or 
disappearance; 18) a savings provision in case some aspect of the trust 
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities; 19) standards for limiting the 
trust protector’s liability; 20) a reference to statutory powers that may 
be incorporated by reference; and 21) an anti-duress provision.73 
The author has several other suggestions to offer the drafters 
of trust instruments.  One helpful technique is a non-binding “letter of 
wishes” to assist the trust protector in the exercise of his discretion.74  
The trust instrument may also provide for a “springing” protector who 
would be appointed under certain circumstances by the trustee, a 
disinterested third party, or a majority of the beneficiaries.75  Finally, 
the author examines some of the tax consequences that might arise in 
connection with the selection of a trust protector and the exercise of 
his powers.76 
As the foregoing description indicates, the author’s book 
contains a wealth of practical information and sage advice about trust 
protectors and their role in trust administration.  However, there are 
                                                   
71 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 149. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 150-67. 
74 Id. at 167-68. 
75 Id. at 175-76. 
76 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 179-86. 
AUSNESS. MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2016  7:49 PM 
2016] TRUST PROTECTORS 121 
 
two recurring themes that run throughout the book which merit 
further discussion.  The first is that drafters and their clients need to 
have a clear idea about the trust’s structure, assets, and objectives.77  
They also should know something about the character and 
circumstances of the trust’s beneficiaries.78  Armed with that 
knowledge, they can select the right person to serve as trust protector 
and identify the powers that he will need to perform his duties 
effectively.  In other words, the trust instrument should give the trust 
protector all of the powers necessary to do his job, but at the same 
time, it should not vest him with unnecessary powers that may cause 
friction with the trustee or interfere with the efficient administration 
of the trust. 
The second recurring theme is whether, and under what 
circumstances, a trust protector should be considered a fiduciary,79 as 
seen in Chapter Three.  The author first considers the difference 
between a personal power and a fiduciary power.  As he points out: 
A personal power is one that can be exercised by the 
powerholder for the powerholder’s own benefit, or for 
the benefit of other parties or purposes, without 
regard, in either case, to the settlor’s intentions (other 
than as may be expressed in the terms of the power…) 
and without regard to any sense of fairness, 
reasonableness, or common sense.80 
A personal power may be general or limited.81  The donee of a general 
power may exercise the power for the benefit of anyone, including 
himself, his estate or his creditors.82  On the other hand, if the power 
is limited or special, the donee may only exercise the power for the 
benefit of a specific beneficiary class.83  The donee of a personal power 
owes no fiduciary duties; however, any exercise that constitutes a 
fraud of the power is void and can be revoked by a court.84 
In contrast, the donee of a fiduciary power, such as a trustee, 
must act for the benefit of another, and in so doing must place the 
interest of that person ahead of his own interests.85  A fiduciary owes 
a duty of loyalty, prudence, and impartiality to the beneficiaries of the 
                                                   
77 See TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1. 
78 Id. 
79 See id. at 11. 
80 Id. at 20. 
81 See id. at 20-21. 
82 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 20. 
83 Id. at 21. 
84 Id. at 20. 
85 Id. at 21. 
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trust and may be held liable for actions or decisions that violate these 
fiduciary duties.86 
The author states that most of the early offshore asset 
protection statutes provided that all powers granted to a trust 
protector were assumed to be personal unless the trust instrument 
provided otherwise.87  This approach was also adopted by a number of 
American statutes.88  Consequently, many trust and estate lawyers 
assume that trust protectors should not be described as fiduciaries.  
According to the author: 
…[T]he legal community in general began to regard the 
protector as a party who could be granted virtually 
unlimited powers over a trust but who, at the same 
time, could be free from all liability for any exercise, 
failure to exercise, negligence, or even refusal to 
exercise a power in the face of a danger to a trust.89 
There are two reasons for the preference for personal powers.  First, 
trust lawyers believed that broad immunity from liability was 
necessary to induce people to agree to serve as trust protectors.90  
Second, they were concerned that treating trust protectors as 
fiduciaries would encourage trustees and beneficiaries to more easily 
overturn their actions in court.91 
Nevertheless, the author makes a compelling argument that 
trust protectors should be treated as fiduciaries in most cases.92  First, 
he examined the reasoning of those courts from foreign jurisdictions 
that have found trust protectors to be fiduciaries.93  He also surveyed 
American court decisions involving trust advisors and found that most 
courts held that trust advisors were fiduciaries.94  Even if trust 
protectors are not exactly the same as trust advisors, their functions 
are sufficiently similar that it would be illogical to treat one as a 
fiduciary but not the other.  The author also maintains that trust 
protectors occupy an office or position that is inherently fiduciary in 
                                                   
86 Id. at 21-23. 
87 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 13. 
88 Id. at 14. 
89 Id. at 15. 
90 Id. at 13-14. 
91 Id. at 14. 
92 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 16. 
93 Id. at 16, 18 (citing Jurgen Von Knieriem v. Berm. Tr. Co., Ltd. [1994] Bda LR 50, Civil Jur. No. 154; 
In re Skeats’ Settlement [1889] 42 Ch. 522, ChD (Eng.); Rawcliffe, supra note 46; Re Freiburg Tr., 
Mourant & Co., Trs., Ltd., supra note 47; In re Circle Tr., supra note 47). 
94 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 9 (citing Warner v. First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 236 F.2d 
853, 861 (8th Cir. 1956); Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819, 36 Del. Ch. 235 (Del. 1957); Gathright’s Tr. v. 
Gaut, 124 S.W.2d 782, 276 Ky. 562 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939)). 
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nature.95 
Having concluded that one who holds the office of trust 
protector must be considered a fiduciary, there remains the question 
of what exactly this means.  The duties and powers vested in a trustee 
provide some guidance to this question.  For example, trust protectors 
are often given the power to direct or veto investment decisions.96  In 
such instances, it would seem that they should have the same duty of 
prudence with respect to these investment decisions that a trustee 
would have.  Likewise, if a trust protector is given the power to direct 
or veto distributions from the trust to various beneficiaries, he should 
be held to a standard of fairness and impartiality in the same manner 
as a trustee.  On the other hand, when a trust protector is vested with 
powers that are not analogous to those commonly vested in a trustee, 
the scope of a trust protector’s fiduciary duties must be determined 
from the nature of the power that he is tasked with exercising. 
One such duty is the duty to monitor the trustee’s actions.  
The author argues persuasively that if the settlor authorizes the trust 
protector to remove the trustee, there is an implied duty on the part of 
the trust protector to monitor the trustee’s behavior to determine 
whether removal might be warranted.97  In other words, even if the 
power to remove the trustee is discretionary, the trust protector still 
has a duty to behave in a responsible manner. 
This issue came up recently in Robert T. McLean Irrevocable 
Trust v. Patrick Davis, P.C.,98 which the author discusses in Chapter 
One.99  In that case, the plaintiff, a successor trustee, alleged that the 
trust protector should have removed the prior trustee,  when evidence 
first came to light that the prior trustee might be spending the trust’s 
money improperly.100  Unfortunately, the trust instrument was 
somewhat contradictory.  It provided that “[t]he Trust Protector’s 
authority...is conferred in a fiduciary capacity and shall be so 
exercised, but…” then went on to declare that “…the Trust Protector 
shall not be liable for any action taken in good faith.”101  In the first 
appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s summary 
judgment for the trust protector, finding that there were disputed 
issues, including the nature of the trust protector’s fiduciary status, 
                                                   
95 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 11. 
96 Id. at 105. 
97 Id. at 102. 
98 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 1 (citing Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Patrick Davis, 
P.C., 283 S.W.3d 786, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)). 
99 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 1-4. 
100 Id. at 3 (citing Robert T. McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 790). 
101 Robert T. McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 796 (Parish, J., concurring). 
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which needed to be resolved in subsequent proceedings.102  Although 
the McLean decision suggested that the trust protector was a 
fiduciary in some respects, it shed little light on what these duties 
might be.  The court in McLean also failed to determine the extent to 
which the trust’s exculpatory clause affected these duties. 
Despite the lack of controlling case law in the United States on 
the issue of a trust protector’s fiduciary duties, the author firmly 
believes that trust protectors have such duties and that they are an 
inherent aspect of the position.103  This, in turn, suggests that settlors 
cannot entirely relieve a trust protector of all liability for breach of 
these duties by means of an exculpatory clause.  In his view, a court 
should disregard any exculpatory provision that purported to relieve a 
trust protector of liability for bad faith, fraud, or willful misconduct 
when these actions caused harm to the trust or its beneficiaries.104 
To conclude, legal commentators agree that trusts are one of 
the most flexible tools available to clients for the efficient disposition 
of their property.  However, as the author observes: 
The protector is probably one of the most significant 
developments to date in trust law and practice.  
Through the use of protectors, trusts that have been 
rendered ineffective or that have proven to fall short of 
the settlor’s objectives because of changes in 
circumstances or changes in the law can be revised, 
restored, and in some cases even re-written by a 
protector given the powers to do so.105 
Legal scholars will appreciate the author’s description of the rise of 
the trust protector in the United States, as well as his analysis of a 
trust protector’s powers, rights, duties, and liability.  For practicing 
lawyers, the author presents a detailed list of do’s and don’ts to guide 
them when they include a trust protector in a trust instrument.  
Those who practice in this area will also benefit from the 
comprehensive collection of drafting forms that are included at the 
end of the book and on a compact disc.  These forms are clearly 
written and can be understood by settlors and other lay persons, as 
well as by those with legal training.  Together, they cover virtually 
any contingency that may arise in connection with the role of a trust 
protector.  In sum, this book is a significant contribution to the 
literature on trust protectors and a great benefit to the field of trusts 
                                                   
102 For a discussion of the subsequent history of the case, see Ausness, supra note 10, at 296-301.  See 
also TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 3. 
103 TRUST PROTECTORS, supra note 1, at 4. 
104 Id. at 16. 
105 Id. at 193. 
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and estates. 
